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7 Judgmental Heuristics and News 
Reporting 
Sharon Dunwoody and Robert J. Griffin 
A kind of cultural folklore has grown up around the practice of news 
reporting to explain how journalists do their job. It's a vibrant and en-
during set of stories, spurred largely by the intersection of two factors. 
One is that, although news products are ubiquitous features of the cul-
turallandscape, the processes that underlie these products are hidden 
from the users. Despite the fact that viewers can often see the newsroom 
looming behind well-groomed anchor peopleduringTV newscasts, they 
are never permitted to see news actually being constructed. The second 
is that our culture (as well as others) regards the effects of media mes-
sages as both powerful and problematic. That is, we are much more 
likely to worry about the negative impacts of media messages than to 
celebrate the positive ones. Legends build rapidly around any process 
that combines mystery with the potential for evil. 
These folkloric explanations are summoned to provide reasons for 
what people see when they attend to news. More specifically, they serve 
to rationalize people's perceptions that their media diet is awash in 
flawed accounts. Here are a few of the explanations that we hear from 
friends and family: 
• Generating the largest audience possible is the primary goal of a 
journalist, and he or she will accomplish this by selecting stories 
that pander to the "lowest common denominator." 
• Entertaining is more important than educating, so journalists 
will "sensationalize" information with few moral qualms. 
• Social responsibility will always play second fiddle to the eco-
nomic bottom line; journalists are out to "sell newspapers," not 
to provide a public service. 
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Like all folklore, these tales contain bits of truth. But they offer a very 
blunt instrument with which to trace the contours of news judgment 
and practice. Put another way, they don't explain much of the vari-
ance in what we see in o~ daily newspapers or on our television news 
programs. 
In this chapter, we offer another set of tools that we think does a much 
better job of accounting for variance in news making. Our argument is 
that any single n~ws story is the product of a host of small, individual-
level decisions: selecting a story topic, choosing the story angle, deciding 
who will serve as a source, making sense of the streams of information 
that come the reporter 's way. Further, we argue that the occupation of 
journalism employs some standardized strategies to make those deci-
sions, judgmental shortcuts that closely resemble the heuristics used by 
most individuals to negotiate daily life. Permit us to emphasize this last 
point: These heuristics are not unique to the news business; rather, jour-
nalistic practice reinforces reporters and editors 10r using heuristics that 
are integral to problem solving for all of us, for better or worse. In the 
course of this chapter, we will discuss some of these heuristic devices 
and will offer a case study from the realm of environmental reporting 
to illustrate our points. Finally, we will speculate about the potential 
effects of such heuristic decision making on news and, ultimately, on 
the audiences for news products. . 
A Couple of Caveats 
The reader should be aware that, although we will rarely use the term 
behavioral decision theory in this chapter, our focus on heuristic decision 
making places us squarely within that psychological domain. Where 
we may depart from some of our colleagues is that we do not, a priori, 
define heuristic decision making as necessarily deficient or irrational. 
Heuristic decisions are indeed superficial ones, as they rely on assessing 
only one or a handful of variables in a multivariate environment. But 
if an individual selects an important subset of variables on which to 
ground his or her decision, that may produce a respectable outcome 
most of the time. The heuristics promoted by journalism are often so 
grounded. And although journalists may utilize evidentiary strategies 
that occasionally make systematic analysts wince, their ways of making 
sense of the world resonate strongly with those of their audiences. One 
explanation of the power of the media, in fact, may be that mass media 
accounts amplify - rather than contradict - cultural sense-making. 
Judgmental Heuristics and News Reporting 179 
This position is consonant with tha t of scholars of judgment and 
decision making who have followed on the heels of economist Herbert 
Simon (1982), who posits that individuals make judgments through a 
process of satisficing, that is, by selecting the first reasonable course of 
action instead of evaluating a larger set of options more systematically. 
Such a strategy is an adaptation, argues Simon, both to one's cognitive 
abilities and to the environment in which a given decision must be made. 
And it's an adaptation that suffices in most instances. 
The psychologist Gerd Gigerenzer has built on Simon 's work. He 
suggests that one-reason decision making, although indeed violating the 
tenets of classical rationality, is effective. 1n one recent stud y, Gigerenzer 
and Goldstein (1996) held a computer-simulation competition between 
one-reason decision making and more effortfu] inference procedures 
and found that the former consistently matched or outperformed the 
latter. 
A final word of caution: Although this chapter will dwell on psycho-
logical processes, it will be important for the reader to resist concluding 
that one can account for 100% of the variance in news making at this 
level. Studies of journalistiC work over the decades have found impor-
tantdeterminants at the cultural (Coleman, 1995; Glasser & Ettema, 1989; 
Silverstone, 1985), occupational/professional (Dunwoody and Griffin, 
1993; Fishman, 1980; McManus, 1991; Tuchman, 1978), and organiza-
tional (Breed, 1955; Dunwoody, 1979; Soloski, 1989) levels. 1n fact, our 
argument in this chapter is, in part, that the occlIpation of journalism 
works to privilege some judgmental shortcuts over others. Like all indi-
viduals, reporters are creatures of their social environment. Our job in 
this chapter is not to ignore the impact of that environment but rather 
to examine the influence of judgmental heuristics as they are brought 
into play within those sociocultural and organizational boundaries. 
Journalistic Judgments 
Journalistic work is characterized by speed, particularly in the world 
of daily news gathering. Products must emerge daily, even hourly; it 
is inconceivable to decide to skip, say, the Wednesday issue of a daily 
newspaper because reporters need more time to report complex stories. 
And new channels such as the World Wide Web are, if anything, ratch-
eting up the need for speed. An Internet news site may be updated on 
a minute-by-minute basis, raising legitimate questions about the social 
value of raw information. 
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In a world of rapidly recurring deadlines, journalists cannot afford 
to engage in systematic information processing. Instead, the occupa-
tion rewards those who can make quick decisions about "what's news" 
and decide rapidly how to cobble together a story. Extremely fast deci-
sions are, perforce, heuristic ones. Thus, journalism is unapologetically 
a world of heuristic decision making. 
To accomplish its work, journalism employs the kinds of judgmen-
tal shortcuts used in other walks of life; it has not constructed unique 
heuristics or even necessarily improved on existing ones. Part of the 
reason for the use of "mainstream" shortcuts is that the occupation has 
historically resisted the notion that one needs specialized training to be-
come a journalist. Individuals are welcomed into the occupation from 
a variety of backgrounds, making it necessary for them to rely on a 
common subset of heuristics. 
But perhaps more importantly, stories that employ the kinds of heur-
istic decision making likely to be used by members of the audience get a 
sympathetic reading from that audience. Readers may immediately see 
the relevance of vivid anecdotal information in a story and thus be more 
likely to learn from such information than from more systematic - but 
more pallid - evidence. Perversely, journalists may be most effective in 
influencing audiences when they employ the kinds of heuristic strate-
gies that may be least effective in producing high-quality informatiori. 
,Although there are many ways to categorize heuristic decision mak-
ing, we will divide the heuristics used by journalists into two groups-
those employed in topic selection and those used to make decisions 
about evidence in the course of reporting and writing a story. In the 
following sections, we provide examples from each category. 
What's Nws? 
Although news is a reconstruction - not a reflection - of reality, jour-
nalists rely heavily on environmental cues to signal when news is oc-
curring. A journalist cannot create a topic from whole cloth; reporters 
who make up events or who interview nonexistent sources run afoul of 
their employers if discovered. (For the account of one promising young 
joumalist who met his end by fabricating, see Bissinger, 1998.) Thus, 
joumalists must monitor events and processes around them and select 
from those myriad possibilities a small subset of happenings to define as 
"news." Given the welter of possible news cues, reporters are quickly so-
cialized to attend to a subset. Here are three of the more important cues: 
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Journalists Pay Attention When Things Go Wrong, Not When Things Go 
Right. The folkloric version of this heuristic is that journalists emphasize 
the negative, not the positive. And indeed, the typical daily newspaper 
or TV news report does seem to wallow in accounts of things going 
awry. A scientist whose fraudulent behavior is revealed will get much 
more press than one who plays by the rules. A convicted felon who, 
upon release from prison, commits another crime will get far more at-
tention than will the former criminal who lives a respectable life after 
release. 
Although individuals in our society routinely disparage this jour-
nalistic emphasis on the negative, it is a popular mainstream heuristic 
(Shoemaker, 1996). We all attend more closely to aberrant, usually nega-
tive happenings than to ordinary events in our environment. These neg-
ative occurrences are so salient that we routinely assign them a greater 
weight than we do positive ones. Slovic and colleagues have found that 
when people confront an array of evidence in the course of making a 
decision, a positive attribute does not count as much as a negative one 
(Slovic, 1992). In trying to decide how to react to a novel technology, for 
example, the presence of a small likelihood of coming to harm (nega-
tive) may outweigh numerous proposed benefits, leading an individual 
to reject the technology. 
Another acknowledgment of the social importance of this heuristic 
is people's tendency to use the mass media as a surveillance device, 
as a way of keeping track of events in their environment (Shoemaker, 
1996). It is apparently far more important to spot catastrophe looming 
than it is to be reminded of social regularity. Thus, the mass media 
typically characterize their societal role as that of serving as society's 
watchdog. That they honor this role more in the breach than in daily 
practice (see, e.g., Donohue, Tichenor, & Olien, 1995) does not detract 
from its importance as an occupational or cultural norm. 
Events Are More Newsworthy ThaI! Processes. The world of deadlines 
presents journalists with a major interpretive challenge. How does one 
give meaning to long-running natural and social processes, the warp 
and woof of daily life, when the goal is to produce independent dollops 
of information - stories - on a weekly, daily, or hourly basis? Sociolo-
gist Gaye Tuchman responds that journalism has established routines 
to help it antiCipate, categorize, and package these processes. The re-
sult is a reconceptualization of the process as a series of discrete events. 
Says Tuchman, "The way in which newsmen classify events-as-news 
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decreases the variability of the raw material processed by news organi-
zations and facilitates routinization" (1997, p . 174). 
The event is a ubiquitous feature of the news, so much so that sources 
have learned to stage events - press conferences, meetings, ceremonies 
of all kinds - to increase their public visibility. Journalists grumble about 
such overt management attempts but turn them into stories anyway. For 
example, even though the Los Angeles Times science writing staff reacted 
skeptically when the University of Utah arranged a press conference in 
1989 to herald the achievement of room-temperature fusion, the news-
paper covered the event. Noted science editor Joel Greenberg: 
It seemed like a textbook case of a story to avoid. The claim, particularly using 
such a technique, seemed fantastic. The research paper had yet to be published 
in a refereed journal. And no one at Princeton or anywhere else where fusion 
research had been pursued for many years had come close to such a result. Most 
science writers knew this was a sensational story that almost certainly would 
prove to be not true, at least not to the point of thE! university's claims. 
Nevertheless, the results emanated from a respected university and from two 
scientists . .. who, as far as anyone could tell, were legitimate members of the 
research community. And finally, whether we covered it or not, it was obvious 
that this was a story destined to lead the television news and make the covers 
of Time and Newsweek (which it did). To ignore it would have been a mistake. 
(Greenberg, 1997, p. 100) . 
Reinterpreting a process as a cascade of events is a spectacularly 
successful heuristic device. It allows journalists to survey their terrain 
rapidly for event markers and to prioritize those markers by some crite-
rion for importance. Events have easily discernible beginnings and end-
ings, simplifying the construction of narratives. Events' ready availabil-
ity in the environment encourages both journalists and society to inter-
pret journalistic work as the process of mirroring - not reconstructing-
reality. And, as with so many of the heuristics employed by journal-
ists, this preference for events is shared by audiences, who also find 
it much easier to grapple with concrete happenings than with diffuse 
processes. 
But the debits of this heuristic are substantial. The notion that events 
are features of the landscape that can readily be seen and selected forces 
journalists to ignore great swaths of process that cannot be easily pack-
aged in event narratives. Journalists' failure to represent abstract con-
cepts and linkages in their stories leads some critics to argue that journal-
istic training robs reporters of the ability to think conceptually. Reporters 
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"do not conceptualize their own experience or place particular, con-
crete facts into broader theoretical frameworks," argues one such critic. 
"Journalists are nontheoretic knowers who depend upon instinctive, 
concrete, first-hand 'acquaintance with' events, not formal, systematic 
'knowledge about'events" (Phillips 1977, p . 70). 
Equally problematic, reliance on events discernible in the environ-
ment promotes a kind of journalistic reactivity that allows sources much 
greater control OVer what becomes news than they otherwise might 
have. McManus (1994) and others find that only a fraction of daily news 
stories can be traced back to journalistic efforts to conceptualize and 
write independently about issues and problems, a process called enter-
prise reporting in the business. Rather, the bulk of a day's news depends 
heavily on the flow of information into the newsroom, much of that 
information packaged by sources specifically to gain the attention of 
reporters and editors. 
News Values. Journalists are routinely confronted by too much news. 
Put another way, of the vast array of happenings in the environment 
available to a journalist on a given day, most must be set aside. And that 
decision must be made in a matter of seconds. There is simply no time 
for thoughtful deliberation, for extended discussions with journalistic 
colleagues about how to approach an issue or about whether a particular 
topiC warrants coverage. Editors and subeditors will engage in regular 
story conferences, but discussions there focus less on what to cover and 
more on such production issues as where in a newspaper or newscast 
to situate a story. 
The speed with which news selections are made requires journalists 
to employ a set of heuristic judgments to categorize the world around 
them. Called news values, these judgments are usually unspoken, oper-
ating at an almost unconscious level. But they are reinforced at all levels, 
from journalism classrooms in universities to the newsroom itself. What 
are these criteria tha t allow a thin trickle of informa tion through the news 
"gate" while keeping much of the rest of the world at bay? Here are a 
few of those values: 
• Size matters. Large-scale happenings are much more likely to 
be noticed and covered than are small-scale happenings. In a 
recent study of media coverage of environmental hazards, for 
example, Freudenburg and colleagues (1996) found that the best 
predictor of media attention was magnitude: the number of 
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casualties or the level of damage caused by the hazard. Below 
a certain size threshold, events were essentially invisible . 
• The closer, the better. Given two similar events, the more ge-
ographically proximate one will get far more media attention 
than the more elistant event. And more proximate sources will 
be preferred to more elistant ones. This focus on proximity helps 
illuminate a number of otherwise puzzling patterns - 'for exam-
ple, the tendency of a reporter attending an international meet-
ing or a national political convention to cover the speeches and 
comments of the hometown delegates, often to the exclusion of 
more visible, more impactful sources . 
• Once a topic has become news, it tends to remain newsworthy. 
That is, once a story has crossed the news threshold, subsequent, 
related events are mudl more likely to be defined as newswor-
thy regardless of their relative importance at the time. To return 
to the cold fusion story by way of example, once the Universi ty 
of Utah press conference had put the topic on the national - nay, 
international - news agenda, reporters returned to it time and 
time again, despite the fact that cold fusion was never demon-
strated to occur in a laboratory. 
News criteria have been the subject of much study over the years, 
with results generally supporting the ubiquity of these heuristic devices 
across time, across countries, and across types of media organizations. 
Frequency of production is a major predictor of news criteria use: The 
more frequently you publish, the more likely you are to utilize these 
judgmental shortcuts. One of the more seminal studies, by Galtung and 
Ruge (1965), remains an excellent conceptual guide to these criteria. 
It bears repeating that the selection criteria employed by journalists 
to decide what's news closely resemble the heuristic devices that people 
use every day to make sense of their world. Thus, one could argue that 
although news is indeed a product of relatively superficial judgments, 
those judgments bear a close resemblance to decisions that most folks 
make about what deserves their time and attention. In that sense, then, 
journalistic decision making may mirror the priorities of the culture 
within which it is embedded. We all love to hate our local newspaper 
or our local TV news team. But there's a good chance that, given the 
Cinderella opportunity to trade places with a reporter for a day, we'd 
make our news selections in ways quite similar to those of our ridiculed 
journalistic colleagues. 
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Sifting and Winnowing the Evidence 
Deciding what's news is only a start, however. Topic in hand, the 
journalist must turn that topic into an actual story; she or he must de-
cide what that story is about. That decision involves not only selecting 
the narrative focus of a story - its angle - but also selecting sources, 
gathering information from them, and then deciding how to represent 
that information in the story itself. Such decisions can be extremely com-
plex. But once again, the speed of the journalistic process requires that 
reporters opt for an array of judgmental shortcuts. We have selected a 
few judgmental shortcuts from the panoply to illustrate our point. 
Objectivity. One of the frustrations of journalism is that, although it is 
given the responsibility of "covering" the world around it and helping 
citizens to make reasoned choices about that world, it can rarely deter-
mine what's true. Both the speed of production and the occupation's 
tendency to eschew specialized training make it extremely difficult for 
a reporter to have either the time or the skill to evaluate competing truth 
claims. Thus, there is some chance that what becomes news may simply 
not be true. 
Journalists have adopted a couple of heuristics to handle this valid-
ity problem and the social criticism that accompanies it. Objectivity is 
one. The practice of objectivity rewards a journalist not for figuring out 
what's true but, in the absence of such analysis, for accurately reflecting 
the voices of others. If you can't tell if someone is telling the truth, in 
other words, at least you can make sure that you are accurately trans-
mitting the person's message. 
The cold fusion story is a good example of this heuristic in action. 
Many science writers doubted the validity of the two scientists' claim, in 
1989, that they had achieved room-temperature fusion. But these jour-
nalists were in no position to render a definitive judgment about the 
truth of that claim. Thus, they felt they had no choice but to cover the 
claim and to concentrate on reproducing it as accurately as possible. 
Achieving objectivity in the cold fusion debate, in other words, was 
good journalism. 
lhis heuristic offers a number of advantages for reporters. Even spe-
cialists in a field understand the difficulty of making and defending 
validity judgments. Science, for example, is replete with challenges to 
validity; there is rarely a consensus on what's true. 1n such a climate, it 
would be disastrous for less specialized individuals to try to ascertain 
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the truth, as their judgments would carry little credibility. An emphasis 
on accuracy is thus much safer than an emphasis on validity. 
But this privileging of accuracy can have negative consequences. Al-
though a manageable gpal, objectivity has become a journalistic ritual 
(Tuchman, 1972) that actually encourages journalists to eschew respon-
sibility for making validity judgments. Journalistic training has never 
included the kinds of systematic analytical tools that members of other 
occupations often utilize for validity purposes. And those reporters who 
actually attempt to make a distinction between more or less likely truth 
claims often find themselves in a kind of no-man's land, bereft of support 
from either their sources or their journalistic peers (see, e.g., Crewdson, 
1993; Fragin, 1998). 
Balancing Contrasting Accounts. A second heuristic that allows journal-
ists to eschew validity judgments is the practice of balancing contrasting 
points of view. Since many arenas contain competing truth claims, this 
heuristic dictates that, in the absence of knowing what's true, a journal-
ist should offer the audience the whole array of possible claims. Thus, 
this judgmental shortcut asks journalists to be responsible for knowing 
about the extent of variance in truth claims, not about the validity of 
those claims. 
Typically, this heuristic gets operationalized in a story by providing 
two competing claims, each meant to demarcate a contrasting domain of 
beliefs. So, for example, if a journalist is writing a story about one group 
of scientists'claim to have found fossilized life in a Martian meteorite, 
the reporter is responsible for seeking a point of view at the other end 
of the belief continuum. The story is not complete, in other words, until 
it contains comments by a scientist who is skeptical of the claim. 
Again, this heuristic encourages the journalist to accomplish a man-
ageable evidentiary task: identifying variance in rather than validity of 
points of view. But the ritualistic practice of balance is often reduced to 
selecting points of view situated at the ends of a belief continuum and 
then giving those (sometimes rather extreme) beliefs equal space. 
interestingly, journalists continue to endorse the concept of balance 
even when they have some evidence suggesting that a belief is not true. 
For example, Dearing (1995) examined coverage of three controversial 
science issues that featured less than believable assertions offered by in-
dividuals considered to be scientific mavericks. One was the 1989 cold 
fusion announcement. The second was the claim by a self-trained clima-
tologist, in 1990, that there was a SO-SO chance that a severe earthquake 
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(the so-called New Madrid quake, which never occurred) would shake 
the lower Midwest by a specific date. And the third was a well-known 
biologist's long-running assertion that the human immunodeficiency 
virus (HN) virus cannot be the cause of acquired immune deficiency 
syndrome (AIDS). 
Dearing found that, in all three cases, despite the fact that journalists 
believed the extreme claims were wrong, they not only included these 
claims in their stories but also, in the interest of balance, provided the 
information in ways that lended legitimacy to them. Thus, he argued, 
balancing truth claims sent the message to readers that these scientific 
mavericks were as likely to be right as the mainstream scientific sources 
on the other side of the issue. 
Preference for the Vivid Anecdotal Account. Psychologists argue that most 
people prefer to make inferences on the basis of vivid anecdotal infor-
mation rather than utilizing systematic or consensus data (Nisbett & 
Ross, 1980). That is, we opt for the concrete over the abstract. 
This heuristic tendency is exacerbated in journalism. Journalistic train-
ing expressly privileges self-reported data by encouraging reporters to 
gather information in face-ta-face interview settings. Systematic data 
are relegated to the position of backup information, available to flesh 
out a story but not intended as primary information on which a story 
can be hung. And when systematic data are indeed the focal point of 
a story - as is often the case when journalists are writing about newly 
published scientific research - reporters will often seek out anecdotal 
information to make the story more "readable." 
For example, when a scientific study some years ago suggested a 
relationship between drinking coffee and the risk of pancreatic cancer, 
the research made front-page headlines around the country. But many 
journalists felt the need for a more vivid, concrete dimension to the tale. 
Some asked the researchers about any changes they might have made in 
their own coffee-drinking habit as a result of the study. Others went to 
locations such as restaurants to confer with coffee drinkers about their 
reactions to the study (Ryan, Dunwoody, & Tankard, 1991). 
This focus on the anecdotal has a distinct storytelling advantage. 
Audiences are more likely to get caught up in vivid personal stories 
than in accounts that rely only on systematic data gathering. But there 
is a risk that both journalist and audience will mistake the personal 
tale as a marker for a larger pattern. We tum to that possibility in the 
following case study about an event in Wisconsin that offered journalists 
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both anecdotal and systematic data. The resulting media coverage of 
the state's attempt to introduce reformulated gas into daily use serves 
as a useful illustration of the kinds of heuristic devices popular among 
joumalists. 
The Reformulated Gas Controversy in Wisconsin 
As a consequence of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, gaso-
line stations in certain urban corridors of the United States have been 
required by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to sell a 
reformulated gas mixture designed to cut down significantly on the lev-
els of automobile-related smog. The additives in reformulated gas are 
ethyl- or ether-based compounds, chief among them methyl tertiary-
butyl ether (MTBE). 
The Milwaukee area, a large urban regjon in Wisconsin on the shores 
of Lake Michigan, was one of the metropolitan areas required to use 
reformulated gas, and Milwaukee gas stations began selling the fuel in 
late fall 1994. Local media reports in early 1995 fueled a growing aware-
ness of the gas, and people began contacting state and federal offices to 
complain that pumping reformulated gas was making them sick. Calls 
eventually mounted into the thousands. Wisconsin finally directed i\s 
state epidemiologists to conduct an investigation of the possible health 
·impacts of reformulated gas, a study that was completed in June 1995 
(Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services, 1995). 
We became interested in media coverage of this controversy because 
the issue confronted joumalists with a challenging array of evidence. 
On the one hand, the early stages of the issue were dominated by vivid 
anecdotal testimonials. Individuals who felt that they had become ill 
from exposure to the gas contacted govemmental officials and media 
organizations to complain and demand redress. Even the state's gover-
nor got into the act, eventually traveling to Washington, DC, to urge the 
U.S. EPA to renege on its requirement that Milwaukee area motorists 
use reformulated gas, a plea that was ultimately unsuccessful. 
But although all this anecdotal information conveyed the perception 
that reformulated gas was causing problems such as nausea and flulike 
symptoms, the state's investigation of those claims offered systematic 
data that painted a very different picture. The state's study was con-
ducted in four parts: 
1. Researchers monitored the air near the pumps dispensing re-
formulated gas to see if substances to which individuals were 
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exposed were any more toxic than normal (any gasoline is made 
of a soup of chemicals, some of which are linked to cancer). 
2. They contacted the health departments of other states using 
reformulated gas to learn if these other locations were also ex-
periencing health disruptions. 
3. They compared the composition of the reformulated gas be-
ing pumped in Milwaukee with that of reformulated gas else-
where. 
4. Finally, researchers conducted a random digit dial phone sur-
vey to compare the rate of occurrence and correlates of health 
complaints in three areas: metropolitan Milwaukee; metropoli-
tan Chicago, where reformulated gas also was in use; and other 
regions of Wisconsin where reformulated gas was not avail-
able. 
State epidemiologists found that a much greater proportion of 
Milwaukee gasoline users reported becoming ill than did those sur-
veyed in other areas, including Chicago, where the same type of refor-
mulated gas was being used. But neither the availability of reformulated 
gas nor the chemical constituents of the gas in Milwaukee predicted 
the illness reports. Rather, the state found that the best predictors of 
the likelihood of feeling ill were (1) having had a cold or the flu and 
(2) an awareness of the possibility that reformulated gas might be a 
health threat. To put that latter predictor in a more colorful context, me-
dia coverage of the reformulated gas controversy was making people 
sick. 
Once the systematic data became available in September 1995, we 
asked: How would Milwaukee media organizations cope with the array 
of evidence now available to them? The reformulated gas issue was cer-
tainly news, as it had led to local TV newscasts several times earlier in 
the winter, when anecdotal evidence poured in about the possible health 
effects. So the new epidemiological study would be readily defined as 
newsworthy. But would meclia organizations continue to privilege the 
earlier anecdotal accounts in the face of strong evidence that Milwaukee 
residents were not becoming ill from exposure to reformulated gas? 
And, given the existence of carefully gathered, systematic data, would 
journalists still feel the need to balance the findings of state epidemiol-
ogists with information skeptical of the new information? 
To answer these questions, we videotaped the reformulated gas news 
stories aired by the three Milwaukee television stations for several days 
after release of the state epidemiological report. We also attended to 
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stories written by journalists working for The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 
the city's daily newspaper. (A more detailed analysis of these findings 
is available in Trumbo, Dunwoody, & Griffin, 1998.) 
Preference for the Vivid 
Although all news organizations began their stories with the an-
nouncement that the state's study had found no health effects that could 
be linked to the use of reformulated gas, reporters typically headed to 
nearby gas stations to ask individuals for their reactions to that news. 
Ultimately, those anecdotal interviews took up equal or more time in the 
stories than did reporters'efforts to explain the study's findings. Thus, 
it was clear that journalists did not feel that the systematic evidence 
could stand on its own; they needed to either bolster or contradict it 
with anecdotal accounts. 
But another possible indicator of the power of the anecdotal account 
lay in the obvious skepticism that journalists brought to the state's 
findings. Recall that journalists had been bombarded for months by 
individual testimonials of illness, a pattern reinforced by actions of 
state officials to convince the U.s. EPA to ban reformulated gas in the 
state. Confronted with a systematic study that debunked the cause-
and-effect assertions, many journalists reacted cautiously, even skepti-
cally. 
For example, when an anchor at one of the Milwaukee television 
stations introduced a story about the survey findings by saying, "The 
state says the facts are in and the new gas we are required to use is 
not a health problem," her coanchor responded: "Not a health problem? 
Thousands of people have complained about the reformulated gaso-
line, saying it makes them sick" (from transcript in Trumbo et. aI., 1998, 
p. 257). 
Another anchor, after sitting through an account of the epidemio-
logical findings, ended the news segment by remarking: "Makes you 
wonder if 15,000 [sic] people could all be wrong" (from transcript in 
Trumbo et al., 1998, p. 262). 
Yet another station embedded the skepticism in its lead-in for the 
story. Said the anchors: "While it runs your car, will it ruin your health? 
A new report on reformulated gas says no. [The two anchors identify 
themselves.] Butsome people are still hesitant to reformulate an opinion 
on that gas" (from transcript in Trumbo et aI., 1998, p. 258). 
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One possibility is that reporters had found the earlier anecdotal ev-
idence persuasive, making it difficult for them to interpret the new, 
systematic data as offering a higher-quality interpretation of reality. 
Stocking and Gross (1989), in a monograph that examines cognitive bias 
in news making, reflect on how reporters - like all folks - tend to adopt 
a set of beliefs and then define subsequent information that supports 
their original theory as more valid than information that doesn't. In this 
case, the state survey stood in stark contrast to the anecdotal accounts, 
making it easy prey to those reporters who had become convinced by 
the earlier accounts of health problems. 
The Persistence of Balance 
If reporters indeed were reacting warily to the new study resuits, 
that wariness would have reinforced occupational pressure to balance 
the study findings with points of view that contradicted it. And that's 
what we found in the television reports. The epidemiological study was 
never allowed to stand unchallenged. Rather, journalists worked to find 
points of view from the other side of the continuum. Some journalists 
went seeking comments from the state's governor, who had earlier gone 
on the record as opposing the use of reformulated gas in the state. (The 
governor, inCidentally, reacted with "no comment.") Others gave space 
to a congressperson who, inexplicably, railed against the validity of us-
ing survey research to accomplish the ends sought by the study. 
In the most extreme instance of balancing, a reporter from one of the 
stations learned that a scientist asked to evaluate the state's study as 
part of a consensus panel had refused to endorse the study's conclusion 
that it had found no link between reformulated gas and reported health 
problems. The reporter tracked down the researcher, put him on the air, 
and literally badgered him into dissenting: 
Reporter voice over: Just [an] hour and a half ago, in a satellite interview from 
Raleigh, (name) told me he never signed off on the study because, he said, 
it's riddled with problems. (Cut to side-by-side shots of the reporter and the 
scientist.) 
Scientist: You simply can' t make that statement ... 
Reporter: The study is flawed, is what you're saying, the study is flawed. 
Scientist: Well, the study ... yea, the study's got a lot of problems, too . . . (cut off 
mid-sentence). (From transcript in Trumbo et ai., 1998, p. 260) 
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And Now for Something Completely Different 
A very different account of the state's findings appeared in The 
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel. Written by the environmental reporter, Don 
Behm (1995), the story clearly privileged the epidemiological work over 
the earlier anecdotal accounts. In fact, it included no anecdotal material 
at all, concentrating instead on explainirtg the study's goals. and meth-
ods and reflecting the views of a variety of individuals regarding the 
meaning of the findings. 
Efforts to balance contrasting viewpoints were also missing from this 
story. A reader would have to have made it to the very bottom of the story 
(which by this time has "jumped" to an inside page) to learn that some 
individuals were taking issue with the state's study. The story offered 
a one-sentence critique by a Wisconsin congress person who referred 
to the study as "bogus." In this account, then, heuristic strategies that 
dominated other accounts were abandoned. 
What lies behind the rather dramatic difference between the newspa-
per and television accounts? One possibility is differential production 
stresses. In addition to its insatiable need for visuals, television can be 
more physically demanding than a daily newspaper. For example, tele-
vision reporters may have to package the same issue two or three times 
in a given day (the noon, early evening, and late evening news shows), 
so time may be even more scarce than at the typical newspaper. When 
time is scarce, heuristic devices blossom. 
A second possible factor accounting for the variance is reporter exper-
tise. Years of reporting on complex environmental issues have enabled 
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel reporter Don Behm to become more adept at 
systematic evaluation of evidence. Specialty reporters, who can spend 
entire careers covering a particular information domain, are among the 
few reporters who are encouraged to develop in-depth knowledge. But 
specialty beats are rare in television - certainly at the local level, where 
reporters are few and equipment cost~ are high. Thus, most TV reporters 
are generalists, unable to develop expertise and rewarded, instead, for 
speed and reliability. 
The reformulated gas story is a case study in how journalists may 
mistake anecdotal evidence as markers of larger patterns. This is a fa-
miliar cycle for all of us, from the scientist who has an unpleasant expe-
rience with a journalist and concludes that all journalists are bad to the 
employer who insists that she can determine the potential of an appli-
cant on the basis of an interview alone. In the course of coverage of the 
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reformulated gas controversy, it is possible that Milwaukee television 
journalists readily defined anecdotal evidence as reflections of a larger 
pattern, that they interpreted the many public complaints about the 
health repercussions of pumping reformulated gas as sufficient evidence 
of a cause-and-effect relationship. Their skeptical reactions to the subse-
quent state epidemiological study certainly bolster this interpretation. 
Discussion 
In this chapter we have put forward an argument on behalf of journalism 
as an occupation that has institutionalized heuristic decision making. 
Without the ability to make extremely quick decisions, daily journalism 
as we know it could not exist. Although some components of the journal-
·ism world - magazines, television and radio documentaries, nonnews 
sections of newspapers - allow reporters to be more reflective, the bulk 
of what counts as journalism demands split-second decisions. 
To accommodate this fact of life, journalism has commandeered a 
host of garden-variety judgmental shortcuts and made them its own. 
Although some have been given occupational labels - the use of news 
values, for instance, or the concept of objectivity - they function within 
the occupation in ways quite similar to their use in daily life. 
That resonance with daily practice may be one of the reasons that 
journalism has evolved to play such an important role in human cul-
ture. We may rely on journalistic accounts not because they are of high 
quality in an evidentiary sense but because journalists think like us. News 
choices validate our own priorities. Journalists'search for cause and ef-
fect parallels our own. It is culturally reassuring to see such consonance 
out and about in the land. 
Policymakers, too, have picked up on that social consonance. They 
are among the most intense users of media information not only to keep 
abreast of the behaviors of other policymakers (Price, 1992) but also, 
presumably, to take advantage of the tendency of mass media channels 
to mirror common cultural judgmental processes. To that extent, then, 
the kinds of heuristic judgments reflected in media accounts provide 
valuable clues for policymakers about popular ways of thinking. 
The Problems with "Thinking Like Us" 
But the tendency of journalists to rely on shortcut decision-making 
strategies is also problematic, for at least a couple of reasons. First, 
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consumers and policymakers tend to believe that news stories indeed 
reflect the more important social occurrences in our environment. Al-
though we may have smiled when Walter Cronkite signed off his news-
cast each evening with "Well, that's the way it is" back in the 1960s and 
1970s, we believed him! one of the most important functions of journal-
istic work seems to be its role in legitimating some forms of reality over 
others. 
By way of illustration, a group of sociologists (Phillips, Kanter, 
Bednarczyk, & Tastad, 1991) tested the legitimizing ability of media 
coverage on a very difficult audience indeed: scientists. The scholars 
isolated two groups of research reports from the prestigious Nw Eng-
land Journal of Medicine that differed on one important variable: One 
group of studies had generated stories in the Nw York Times and the 
other group had not. The SOCiologists controlled for a host of other con-
founding variables and then looked at how frequently the studies got 
cited in the scientific literature in the ensuing years. 
To their astonishment, those studies that got Nl!w York Times atten-
tion received 73% more citations in the peer-reviewed literature than 
did the equally good but less publicly visible studies. The investigators 
concluded that the New York Times was playing a role in establishing the 
importance and legitimacy of particular research efforts even for other 
specialists within these scientists'own fields . 
. Admittedly, few media organizations have the legitimizing clout of 
the Nw York Times. But even Times reporters must rely on judgmental 
shortcuts to select those topiCS to which they will attend, to make judg-
ments about sources, and the like. Thus, relatively superficial heuris-
tics may playa disproportionate role in constructing reality for media 
consumers. 
Policymakers seem to fall prey to this legitimizing function of the 
media just as easily as do other inhabitants of American culture. Al-
though the ability of the mass media to help establish public notions of 
what's important has been amply demonstrated across time and topic, 
evidence grows that media content may have even more powerful ef-
fects on policymakers'agendas. For example, in one study of the agenda-
setting influence of mass media coverage of global warming during 
the 1980s and early 199Os, Trumbo (1995) found that media accowlts 
had little influence on lay audiences' judgments of the importance of 
this environmental topic but profoundly affected policymakers' judg-
ments. Even more interesting, the effect formed a kind of feedback loop: 
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Actions by policymakers produced media stories, which in turn served 
as catalysts for further policy action. 
A second possible debit of the ubiquity of shortcut decision making in 
daily journalism is that journalistic practices may encourage heuristic 
thinking among members of the audience. It is likely that we all uti-
lize judgmental shortcuts for most decision-making needs. But we are 
routinely enjoined to resort to systematic thinking whenever possible, 
certainly when important decisions loom. Confronted with a compli-
cated medical situation, we are urged to seek a second opinion. Faced 
with a long but somewhat unpredictable earnings life, we are advised 
to learn about different kinds of savings options and to make multi-
variate plans for a secure economic future. Information processing that 
·seeks and evaluates altematives is difficult, however. And most of us 
are, quite simply, bad at it. 
Although journalism exists ostensibly to help individuals make rea-
soned decisions about the world around them, the heuristic base that 
buttresses the business offers up to information consumers the same 
kinds of judgmental shortcuts to which those consumers themselves 
may fall prey. Thus, a search for information that includes a heavy re-
liance on media accounts may reinforce individuals in their own hur-
ried heuristic habits. The confluence of a complex medical situation and a 
newspaper story about it may encourage a reader to contact the medical 
center featured in the story, no questions asked. Similarly, an individual 
at sea regarding her financial future may latch onto a financial adviser 
whose ad appears in a local magazine. From such heuristic judgments 
is the edifice of advertising built. 
When policymakers encounter topics in the news that are near and 
dear to their hearts, we would expect those individuals to be more re-
sistant to the potential media reinforcement of heuristic thinking strate-
gies. Although policymakers are indeed heavy users of mass media, 
they come to these channels with well-developed belief systems about 
specific topics and issues. Such belief systems make individuals more 
likely to be information cOlls/rue/ors than information ingesters. That is, 
such persons are less likely to be influenced by message content than 
they are to "rewrite" that content to fit their prevailing mental maps. 
On the other hand, when policymakers encounter media information 
for which they don't have well-developed beliefs, they may be subject to 
the same reinforcement effect that may bedevil the public itself. That is, 
they may naively conclude that if it's in the newspaper, it must be true. 
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Effecting Change 
Although daily journalism is unavoidably an occupation dominated 
by heuristic judgments, occupants of other journalistic niches may have 
the time and resources to think more systematically and make more 
careful decisions about who and what. Magazine articles, broadcast doc-
umentaries, and newspaper series are often the product of weeks or 
months of thought, reflection, information gathering, and writing. Jour-
nalists who are equipped to view the world more systematically should 
be able to flourish in these modes. 
But are journalists so equipped? Whereas the typical journalist of 
19th- and early-20th-<:entury America entered the occupation via an 
apprenticeship system, today's journalists increasingly get their basic 
training in university journalism programs (Weaver and Wilhoit, 1996). 
Those programs urge on their students a bifurcated education: On the 
one hand, the programs work to instill basic professional skills and val-
ues; on the other, they push their young charges to attain a traditional 
liberal arts education. A typical ratio of coursework would be one skills 
course to every two or three courses elsewhere in the university. 
Unfortunately, neither of those educational goals gives young jour-
nalists systematic information processing skills in today's university. 
Most schools fail either to define such skills as part of an individual's 
b~sic competencies or, even if they do identify the ability to process in-
formation systematically as an important tool, to offer courses that give 
students basic training in it. Journalisrn courses are no different. 
This means that journalists will continue to make relatively super-
ficial judgments about the world around them. Most of those judg-
ments will be reasonably good ones, and we information consumers 
will be well served, all told. But the business of journalism is simply not 
equipped to tum a sustained, systematic eye to an issue in ways that 
illuminate that issue's basic assumptions. As one historian put it many 
years ago, journalism is "history on the run." A dead run does not offer 
a good venue for systematic thinking. 
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